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This chapter presents the systemic vulnerability and risk analysis performed regularly 
by the Banco de España as a basis for its macroprudential policy actions. Specifically, 
the first section uses two tools, the heat map and the systemic risk indicator, that 
provide a first approximation to recent risk developments. The second part presents a 
study in greater depth of the time/cyclical dimension of systemic risk and presents an 
ex-ante impact analysis of setting a positive countercyclical capital buffer rate. This 
analysis suggests that, according to the forecasts currently available, various 
reference indicators will exceed the thresholds for activation of this buffer in the first 
half of 2021. If this macroprudential instrument is activated, the credit institutions 
affected will have a period of 12 months to comply with the requirement. However, 
this diagnosis is dependent upon materialisation of the central forecast scenario, 
which is currently subject to numerous downside risks. Should these risks materialise 
the above analysis would have to be adjusted accordingly. 
3.1 Analysis of systemic vulnerabilities
The	 map	 of	 systemic	 vulnerability	 indicators	 shows	 no	 signs	 of	 build-up	 of	
systemic	 risk1 (see Chart 3.1). The heat map categories that group together credit, 
liquidity and macroeconomic imbalance indicators have remained stable at absence-of-
alert levels since the last edition of the FSR. In the case of indicators related to credit 
growth, it should be noted that during the first two quarters of 2019 total credit to the 
non-financial private sector (referring to total financing to this sector, not only banking 
credit) posted slightly positive growth rates, for the first time since 2010. For the time 
being, the real estate market indicators show no signs of risk either, since the sustained 
increase in house prices has still not translated into widespread overvaluation. In fact, in 
both cases, the absence of alerts is due to the fact that the starting levels were well 
below the thresholds that trigger alerts in the heat map. Accordingly, for a change in the 
degree of risk to occur, the trends observed in recent periods would have to be sustained.
1  The map of systemic vulnerability indicators aggregates data from a broad set of indicators, according to 
their	ability	to	predict	systemic	banking	crises.	The	definitions	of	the	main	categories	correspond	to	those	
established by the European Systemic Risk Board in its Recommendation ESRB/2013/1 on intermediate 
objectives and instruments of macro prudential policy. For the chart to be interpreted correctly it needs to 
be taken into account that the intensity of the alerts in each category represents a weighted average of the 
indicators included. Intensity increases as the tone draws closer to red, while green depicts a normal 
situation.	Details	of	the	specific	indicators	included	in	each	category,	and	of	how	their	weights	are	calculated,	
are to be found in Mencía, J. and Saurina, J. (2016) “Macroprudential policy: objectives, instruments and 
indicators”, Occasional Paper No. 1601, Banco de España.
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The	liquidity	indicators	reflect	a	situation	of	low	risk,2	partly	as	a	consequence	
of	the	ECB’s	accommodative	monetary	policy,	and	improvements	are	observed	
in the concentration indicators. The liquidity indicator is made up, on the one 
hand, of information on market liquidity and, on the other, of indicators of liquidity on 
bank balance sheets. The indicators relating to the liquidity on bank balance sheets 
have shown no signs that would give rise to concern, while the market indicators have 
shown somewhat more volatility, although also improvements in the case of 
government debt liquidity in the first half of 2019. In general, market liquidity is 
expected to continue to improve following the ECB’s decision to implement further 
medium-term refinancing operations. The risk level of the concentration indicators 
has fallen to medium-low. This is because the concentration of credit among large 
firms has declined, while exposure to the construction and real estate development 
sectors continues to fall, as part of the process of improvement in the quality of bank 
balance sheets mentioned in Chapter 2. Financial market turbulence, meanwhile, 
decreased slightly in the first half of 2019 from the levels recorded at the end of last 
year, partly as a result of the measures implemented by many central banks. Finally, 
the macroeconomic imbalance indicators and the indicators of the current economic 
and financial situation remained unchanged.
2  One of the indicators that made up this subgroup in previous editions of the FSR has had to be replaced by 
another as it has ceased to be available. It is for this reason that its level has been revised retrospectively. 
The map of systemic vulnerabilities, designed to provide early warning of systemic banking crises, remains stable without any risk or low-risk 
warnings, while the imbalances and the economic and financial situation have not seen any changes in grading.
HEAT MAP BY SUB-CATEGORY (a) (b)
Chart 3.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The colour scheme identifies four levels of risk: i) green denotes a normal, risk-free situation, ii) yellow indicates low risk, iii) orange is medium risk and, 
iv) red is high risk. The shaded band denotes the last systemic crisis. Some indicators as at December 2018 are based on provisional information.
b The 2019 indicators are available up to June 2019.
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The	systemic	risk	indicator	(SRI)	has	declined	during	2019 (see Chart 3.2). That 
said, the volatility measures in this indicator have increased in recent months. These 
episodes of market volatility stem from the downward skew of global growth 
prospects and from new geopolitical tensions, the trade war between the United 
States and China, and the possibility of a no-deal Brexit. The recent developments 
in these episodes have not been reflected by the aggregate SRI as they have been 
confined to specific markets, showing a low correlation with other components of 
the indicator. This also indicates that the episodes have not been systemic in scope. 
In any event, it should be taken into account that the SRI indicator is a coincident 
indicator of the financial situation and, therefore, is not designed to anticipate future 
risks. In fact, this indicator currently stands at extraordinarily low levels, not seen 
since the years prior to the last financial crisis. It is not possible to rule out that the 
markets are, as then, underestimating the significant risks that exist, so that sudden 
changes in their perception may lead to significant rises in this indicator. 
The	Banco	de	España	is	starting	to	analyse	other	risks	to	medium	and	long-
term	 financial	stability, including those deriving from the energy transition and 
climate change, and from potential changes in market structure as a result of 
technological change, which is conducive to the entry of new competitors. The role 
of the financial system in the management of these risks is also being analysed. 
Box 3.1 provides a general outline of the economic risks associated with climate 
change, and of the various initiatives existing in the financial sector to address 
them, while Box 3.2 describes the risks to financial stability associated with the 
project to create Libra.
In 2019 to date, the systemic risk indicator (SRI) has remained at historically very low levels.
SYSTEMIC RISK (a)
Chart 3.2
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España.
a For a detailed explanation of this indicator, see Box 1.1 in the May 2013 FSR.
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3.2 Macroprudential policy instruments and actions
In	2019	Q3	and	Q4,	the	Banco	de	España	has	held	the	countercyclical	capital	
buffer	rate	(CCyB)	at	0%. This decision is based on a technical analysis of quantitative 
indicators combined with qualitative information. The quantitative indicators that 
guide the CCyB decisions include indicators intended to reflect the stage of the credit 
cycle of the non-financial private sector and its excessive growth, the potential 
overvaluation of house prices, the burden of interest and principal payments on loans 
to households and firms (debt service), the external imbalance and the macroeconomic 
environment.3 The technical analysis assesses the recent developments in the 
indicators, their current situation and also their expected behaviour over the next few 
quarters, in line with the macroeconomic forecasts prepared on a quarterly basis by 
the Banco de España.4 This latter element is very important, because, in the event 
that the CCyB is activated, institutions have 12 months to comply with the requirement. 
The	 credit	 cycle	 indicator	 continues	 to	 show	 values	 below	 the	 activation	
thresholds	 (in	 terms	 of	 the	 credit-to-GDP	 ratio,	 which	 remains	 below	 its	 
long-term	trend	value),	although	it	is	progressively	approaching	equilibrium. 
Specifically, the adjusted credit-to-GDP gap which assumes a credit cycle duration in 
line with the empirical evidence for Spain, is still showing a negative value (–8 pp on 
data to June 2019), although it is progressively approaching the activation threshold 
of 2 pp.5 The upward trend of this indicator has been evident since the end of the last 
crisis (see Chart 3.3). The projections for this indicator over the next few years 
suggest that it will become positive in around 2021 Q1 and could exceed the 
activation threshold in Q2 of that year. The available econometric models – which 
estimate the equilibrium level of the credit-to-GDP ratio on the basis of its relationship 
with other fundamental macro-financial variables according to economic theory – 
also currently show negative gaps with respect to this equilibrium level, which are 
rapidly shrinking.6
The	output	gap,	meanwhile,	has	been	positive	since	the	beginning	of	the	year,	
and	is	projected	to	expand	in	future. This suggests that the level of GDP is now 
3  A technical analysis of the selection of indicators used can be consulted in Castro, C., Estrada, A. and 
Martínez, J. (2016), “The Countercyclical Capital Buffer in Spain: An Analysis of Key Guiding Indicators”, 
Working Paper No. 1601, Banco de España.
4  See, for example, Banco de España (2019): “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin, 
Banco de España, 3/2019, pp. 5-67.
5  A description of the adjusted gap and its performance can be found in Box 3.2 of the Spring 2019 FSR. For 
details of the calculation of the adjusted gap and a comparison with the Basel gap and other alternatives, 
see Galán, J.E. (2019), “Measuring	credit-to-GDP	gaps.	The	Hodrick-Prescott	filter	revisited”, Occasional 
paper No. 1906, Banco de España.
6  For further information on these models, see Galán, J.E. and J. Mencía (2018), “Empirical Assessment of 
Alternative Structural Methods for Identifying Cyclical Systemic Risk in Europe”, Working Paper No. 1825, 
Banco de España.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 103 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, AUTUMN 2019  3 MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY
above its long-term equilibrium value, following several years of above-potential 
growth. It appears that this growth will continue over the next two years, even 
following the downward revision to the economic outlook. 
Some	complementary	 quantitative	 indicators	 also	point	 to	 a	 growing	 trend	
over	the	next	two	years.	In particular, credit intensity, which measures the change 
in credit as a percentage of GDP, and house prices (see Chart 3.4) currently display 
values close to equilibrium, with an upward trend that is projected to continue over the 
next two years. Thus, credit intensity posted a positive value in 2019 Q1. Although 
this value is still low and, on June 2019 data, it will return to negative territory, this 
is the first time that it has been positive since the start of the crisis. The case of 
the indicators of house price imbalances is similar, insofar as narrowly positive 
values were observed for some of its basic components during the first two quarters 
of 2019, with the average remaining very close to equilibrium. If the expected trend 
in house prices continues, all the indicators in this category can be expected to 
show positive values towards the end of next year. As regards the debt service of the 
non-financial private sector, the decline that began at the beginning of the global 
financial crisis has continued. Currently, the adjustment of this indicator has been a 
consequence of the deleveraging in this sector, although, subsequently, the reduction 
in interest rates has also made a significant contribution. In consequence, this 
reduction can be expected to continue, albeit at a more moderate pace over the next 
The output gap has continued to show positive values and is expected to do so for the next two years. The adjusted credit-to-GDP gap, 
meanwhile, continues to narrow and this process has accelerated in the first two quarters of 2019. This gap is expected to turn positive at 
the beginning of 2021.
OUTPUT GAP AND CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP (a)
Chart 3.3
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The shaded area shows the last period of systemic banking crisis (2009 Q1-2013 Q4). The dotted lines represent forecasts.
b The output gap is the percentage difference between the observed GDP and potential GDP. Values calculated at constant 2010 prices. See 
Cuadrado, P. and Moral-Benito, E. (2016), "Potential growth of the Spanish economy", Occasional Paper 1603, Banco de España.
c The credit-to-GDP gap is calculated as the difference, in percentage points, between the observed ratio and the long-term trend calculated using a 
one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 25,000. This value is more in line with the financial cycles historically observed 
in Spain.
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two years, given that the debt reduction process has slowed significantly and interest 
rates have little room to fall further. Finally, the current account balance continues to 
show a small surplus (see Chart 3.4) and is expected to remain relatively stable over 
the next few years. 
Although	the	macroeconomic	environment	may	appear	potentially	favourable	
for	 activation	 of	 the	 CCyB,	 this	 diagnosis	 depends	 upon	 materialisation	 
The complementary indicators for calibration of the CCyB show no signs of cyclical systemic risk build-up, although, if current trends 
continue, those relating to credit and prices in the real-estate sector will show some signs of alert over the next two years.
COMPLEMENTARY INDICATORS TO GUIDE THE SETTING OF THE CCyB (a)
Chart 3.4
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The shaded area shows the last period of systemic banking crisis (2009 Q1-2013 Q4). The dotted lines and lightly shaded area represent forecasts.
b The credit intensity indicator is calculated as the annual change in credit to the non-financial private sector divided by cumulative GDP of the last 
four quarters.
c The shaded area represents the range between the minimum and maximum values of the set of four indicators of imbalances in the real estate 
sector.
d Ratio of debt service in the non-financial private sector calculated as specified in Drehmann M. and M. Juselius (2012) "Do debt service costs affect 
macroeconomic and financial stability?", BIS Quarterly Review, September.
e The current account balance series is expressed as a percentage of GDP and seasonally adjusted.
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of	 the	 central	 projection	 scenario,	 which	 is	 currently	 subject	 to	 numerous	
downside	risk	factors. Since legislation specifies that institutions must, in normal 
circumstances, have a one-year margin between activation of the CCyB and when 
they are required to comply with it, the expected behaviour of the relevant indicators 
should be given significant weight in the decision-making process. This diagnosis 
must be conditional upon materialisation of the central macro-financial projection 
scenario. If any of the risks mentioned before were to materialise (geopolitical 
uncertainty, the risk of a no-deal Brexit, intensification of the trade war, delay in the 
recovery of economic growth in the euro area), this diagnosis would be subject to 
change. In short, the current setting warrants keeping the CCyB at 0% for the time 
being. That said, both the short-term risks and the behaviour and projections of the 
indicators, mainly those relating to credit, house prices and economic growth, need 
to be closely monitored.
The	CCyB	is	an	instrument	designed	to	be	released	in	recessions. It is important 
that all financial system agents internalise the fact that, due to its countercyclical 
nature, the CCyB is designed to be built up during the expansionary phase of the 
cycle and released during recessions or sharp economic slowdowns, when banks 
may begin to record losses on their lending and to consume capital. If, in these 
circumstances, institutions are not permitted to reduce their levels of total capital 
by the amount of the previously accumulated buffer, the result may be a notably 
restricted supply of credit that further deepens the recession. Note that, when the 
economy is at the bottom of the cycle, banks’ profits fall and investors’ risk perception 
may be very pessimistic, seriously limiting the ability of banks to obtain funds 
internally (by retaining earnings) or externally. In these circumstances, the most likely 
solution is that they will reduce the size of their balance sheets and the supply of 
credit. Naturally, the intensification of the recession will tend to further worsen the 
situation of the banks. 
Decisions	regarding	the	timing	of	the	release	will	be	taken	on	the	basis	of	a	set	
of	quantitative	and	qualitative	indicators	of	the	situation	of	the	financial	cycle. 
As Recommendation 2014/1 of the ESRB indicates, the same indicators that are 
used to calculate the CCyB may also contain useful information for its release. 
However, these indicators may provide imprecise information, as they were not 
designed specifically for this purpose. For this reason, the ESRB also recommends 
using information on bank funding markets, as well as indicators of general systemic 
stress in the financial markets. For example, the SRI presented in Chart 3.2 would 
come under this second category. Thus a significant and sustained increase in the 
SRI would be a possible signal that would help to identify the optimum moment for 
release. Obviously, this decision should also be based on leading indicators of 
economic activity.
In	 the	 event	 of	 release	 of	 the	 CCyB,	 the	 effect	 on	 the	 requirements	 for	
institutions should be immediate. Recommendation 2014/1 of the ESRB 
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advocates release of the CCyB without delay when systemic risk materialises, so as 
to moderate institutions’ procyclical behaviour and facilitate the absorption of losses. 
However, the recommendation itself indicates that a gradual release would be 
preferable when risks are not observed to materialise but are judged to recede. 
The	Banco	 de	España	 is	 carrying	 out	 various	 studies	 on	 the	 impact	 that	 a	
potential	 activation	 of	 the	 CCyB	would	 have	 on	 credit	 to	 the	 non-financial	
private sector and on other macroeconomic variables. First, it is possible to 
estimate the cost of activating the CCyB in terms of credit using a structural vector 
autoregressive model. In principle, a standardised 1 pp increase in the CCyB during 
an upswing may lead to reductions in credit of up to 1.4 pp. The maximum effects 
would occur between one and two years after activation. However, the empirical 
evidence shows that release of the buffer during systemic crises has a much greater 
positive impact, mitigating the contraction in credit. 
In	this	respect,	the	experience	of	use	of	dynamic	provisions	in	Spain	provides	
useful	 lessons	 regarding	 the	potential	 impact	of	 the	CCyB. In particular, the 
available studies indicate that the introduction of countercyclical provisions in an 
expansionary setting, which is similar to the activation of the CCyB, had no effect 
on aggregate lending, although it may have caused some changes in portfolio 
composition at the most affected banks. However, the most notable effect is that 
stemming from the release of these countercyclical provisions in recessions. On the 
basis of this evidence, it is estimated that an increase of 1 pp in the CCyB during an 
upswing would provide, in the event of release during a systemic crisis, additional 
lending to businesses of up to 5.5 pp and would have a positive effect on the 
probability of their survival and on employment.7
The	evolution	of	bank	capital	 in	Spain	over	the	last	150	years	has	also	been	
analysed,	providing very rich information on the behaviour of capital over varied 
financial cycles and in very different banking activity environments.8 This analysis 
also indicates that the activation of the CCyB during upswings generates relatively 
limited costs: a CCyB requirement of 1 pp moderates credit growth by around 
0.8 pp. However, the benefits arising from the release of the CCyB during systemic 
crises clearly exceed these costs, and can even mitigate the fall in lending by 6 pp 
during a recession. This suggests that the adverse impact of their activation on 
credit growth during upswings is more than offset by the positive effect of their 
release during systemic crises. 
7  Jiménez, G. Ongena, S., Peydró, J.L. and J. Saurina (2017): “Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank 
Capital Buffers and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments”, Journal 
of Political Economy, Vol. 125, No 6.
8  Bedayo, M. Estrada, A. and J. Saurina (2018), “Bank capital, lending booms and busts. Evidence from 
Spain in the last 150 years”,	Working	Paper	No.	1847,	Banco	de	España,	also	find	that	an	increase	of	1	pp	
in the CCyB in anticipation of a global systemic crisis reduces the decline in credit in recessions by 6 pp.
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Accordingly,	the	empirical	evidence	available	for	the	case	of	Spain	shows	the	
existence	 of	 significant	 asymmetry	 between	 the	 (relatively)	 low	 costs	 of	
activating	the	CCyB	and	the	(relatively)	large	benefits	of	their	release	during	
downturns. That in turn indicates the importance of the release process being 
supported by clear and transparent communication, generating adequate 
expectations and incentives for economic agents and the general public.

